Emotional intelligence: New ability or eclectic traits? by Mayer, John D. et al.
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Psychology Scholarship College of Liberal Arts (COLA)
9-1-2008
Emotional intelligence: New ability or eclectic
traits?
John D. Mayer





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/psych_facpub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts (COLA) at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For
more information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2008a). Emotional intelligence: New ability or eclectic traits? American Psychologist, 63,
503-517.
Emotional Intelligence   1 





Emotional Intelligence: New Ability or Eclectic Traits?  
 
John D. Mayer  
University of New Hampshire 
Peter Salovey 




Prepublication version of: 
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2008). Emotional intelligence: New ability or 




 The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments of Marc A. Brackett and Susan E. 
Rivers, as well as the contributions of several anonymous reviewers, all of whom commented on 
drafts of this manuscript.   
 Disclosure:  John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David R. Caruso receive royalties from 
the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, which is published by Multi-Health 
Systems (MHS), Toronto, Canada. 
 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to John D. Mayer, 







Emotional Intelligence   2 
Abstract 
 
 Some individuals have a greater capacity than others to carry out sophisticated 
information processing about emotions and emotion-relevant stimuli, and to use this information 
as a guide to thinking and behavior.  We have termed this set of abilities emotional intelligence 
(EI).  Since the introduction of the concept, however, a schism has developed in which some 
researchers focus on EI as a distinct group of mental abilities, and other researchers instead study 
an eclectic mix of positive traits such as happiness, self-esteem, and optimism.  Clarifying what 
emotional intelligence is and is not can help the field by better distinguishing research that is 
truly pertinent to emotional intelligence from what is not.  Emotional intelligence – 
conceptualized as an ability – is an important variable both conceptually and empirically, and it 
shows incremental validity for predicting socially-relevant outcomes.   
 
KEYWORDS: Emotion, intelligence, emotional intelligence, personality, measurement 
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Emotional Intelligence: New Ability or Eclectic Traits? 
 
The notion that there is an emotional intelligence (EI) began as a tentative proposal 
(Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990).  The original idea was that some 
individuals possess the ability to reason about and use emotions to enhance thought more 
effectively than others.  Since 1990, EI has grown into a small industry of publication, testing, 
education, and consulting (Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 
2002).  Matthews et al. (2002) have outlined the dramatic growth of the psychological literature 
concerning an emotional intelligence.  Yet the apparent size of the field dwarfs what we regard 
as relevant scientific research in the area.  In fact, one commentator recently argued that 
emotional  intelligence is an invalid concept, in part because it is defined in too many ways 
(Locke, 2005, p. 425).  
The original definition of emotional intelligence conceptualized it as a set of interrelated 
abilities (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990).  Yet, other investigators describe 
emotional intelligence as an eclectic mix of traits, many dispositional, such as happiness, self-
esteem, optimism, and self-management rather than ability-based (Bar-On, 2004; Boyatzis & 
Sala, 2004; Petrides & Furnham, 2001; Tett, Fox, & Wang, 2005).  This alternative approach to 
the concept – the use of the term to designate eclectic mixes of traits – has led to considerable 
confusion and misunderstandings as to what an emotional intelligence is, or should be (Daus & 
Ashkanasy, 2003; Gohm, 2004; Mayer, 2006).  Many features, such as self-esteem, included in 
these models do not directly concern emotion or intelligence or their intersection (Matthews et 
al., 2004, p. 185).  We agree with many of our colleagues who have noted that the term 
emotional intelligence is now employed to cover too many things – too many different traits; too 
many different concepts (Landy, 2005; Murphy & Sideman, 2006; Zeidner, Roberts, & 
Matthews, 2004).  “These models,” wrote Daus and Ashkanasy (2003, pp. 69-70) “have done 
more harm than good regarding establishing emotional intelligence as a legitimate, empirical 
construct with incremental validity potential.”  This article explores those key criticisms of the 
field, contrasting what we believe to be a meaningful theory of emotional intelligence with 
models describing it as a mix of traits. 
Our principal claim is that a valid EI concept can be distinguished from other approaches.  
This valid conception of emotional intelligence includes the ability to engage in sophisticated 
information processing about one’s own and others’ emotions, and then to use this information 
as a guide to thinking and behavior.  That is, individuals high in EI pay attention to, use, 
understand, and manage feelings, and these skills serve adaptive functions that potentially benefit 
themselves and others (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; Salovey & Grewal, 2005).  As we use 
the term, emotional intelligence is an instance of a standard intelligence that can enrich the 
discussion of human capacities (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001).  
 The deeper question raised by Locke (2005) and others’ assertions that emotional 
intelligence has become over-general is: “How does one decide something ought or ought not to 
be called emotional intelligence?”  To address this, the first section of this article, “The Schism 
in the Field” examines the central conception of EI and how the current confusion in the field 
grew.  The second section, “The Four Branch Model of Emotional Intelligence,” further 
describes our approach to emotional intelligence.  The third section, “The Significance of 
Emotional Intelligence,” examines the various reasons that emotional intelligence is important as 
a discrete variable.  Finally, in the “Discussion and Recommendations” section, consideration is 
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given to how the term emotional intelligence has come to be so misused and the steps that can be 
taken to improve terminology and research in the area.     
 
THE SCHISM IN THE FIELD 
 
Initial Ideas 
 Our initial view of emotional intelligence was that it consists of a group of related mental 
abilities.  For example, we first defined EI as a “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ 
feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s 
thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189).  An empirical companion piece 
operationalized aspects of  EI as an ability: participants examined a set of colors, faces, and 
designs, and, for each, had to identify its emotional content (Mayer et al., 1990).  In a subsequent 
editorial in the journal Intelligence, we discussed the difference between traits such as 
extraversion, self-confidence and EI, noting: 
…Although a trait such as extraversion may depend on social skill, or result in it, 
[it] is a…preference rather than an ability.  Knowing what another person feels, in 
contrast, is a mental ability.  Such knowledge may stem from g, or be somewhat 
independent of it.  The way in which we have defined emotional intelligence – as 
involving a series of mental abilities – qualifies it as a form of intelligence  
(Mayer & Salovey, 1993, p. 435).  
 Although we were clear about our ability conception, we acknowledge that our earliest 
model was, in some of its specifics, overly broad.  That model, for example, included flexible 
planning and creative thinking as two skills involved in utilizing emotions (Salovey & Mayer, 
1990, p. 190).  Subsequent interpreters of our work, however, were instrumental to (what we 
regard as) unmooring the concept from its key terms.  Those interpreters appear to have confused 
what we thought of as expressions of emotional intelligence, with the ability itself.  For example, 
we suggested that the emotionally intelligent person might be “a pleasure to be around,” and that 
those lacking in EI might be prone to depression (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 201)  Elsewhere in 
those early writings, we noted EI might be related to openness (Mayer & Salovey, 1993, p. 438).   
External Factors 
 A journalistic rendering of emotional intelligence created and also complicated the 
popular understanding of it.  Goleman’s (1995) best-selling book, Emotional Intelligence, began 
with the early version of our EI model but mixed in many other personality traits including 
persistence, zeal, self-control, character as a whole, and other positive attributes.  The book 
received extensive coverage in the press, including a cover story in Time magazine (Gibbs, 1995, 
October 2).  Because the book included, in part, the theory we developed, some investigators 
wrongly believed that we endorsed this complex and, at times, haphazard composite of attributes 
as an interpretation of emotional intelligence. 
 The journalistic version became the public face of EI, and attracted further attention, in 
part, perhaps, owing to its extraordinary claims.  Goleman (1995, p. 34) wrote of EI’s importance 
that “…what data exist, suggest it can be as powerful, and at times more powerful, than IQ.”  A 
few years later, Goleman remarked (1998a, p. 94) that “nearly 90% of the difference” between 
star performers at work and average ones was due to EI.  Although these ideas appeared in trade 
books and articles, they were widely disseminated and influenced scientific articles as well.  For 
example, one refereed journal article noted that “EI accounts for over 85% of outstanding 
performance in top leaders” and “EI – not IQ – predicts top performance” (Watkin, 2000, p. 89).  
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Our own work never made such claims, and we actively critiqued them (Mayer, 1999; Mayer & 
Cobb, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000).  More recently, 
Goleman wrote that others who believed that EI predicts huge proportions of success had 
misunderstood his 1995 book (Goleman, 2005, p. xiii). 
The Advent of Mixed Models 
 With EI defined in the public mind as a variety of positive attributes, further approaches 
continued to expand the concept.  One defined EI quite broadly as, “an array of noncognitive 
capabilities, competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping with 
environmental demands and pressures” (Bar-On, 1997, p. 14).  Although the model included 
emotion-related qualities such as emotional self-awareness and empathy, into the mix were 
added many additional qualities including reality testing, assertiveness, self-regard, and self-
actualization.  It was this mixing in of related and unrelated attributes that led us to call these 
mixed models of EI (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000).  A second mixed model of EI included 
such qualities as trustworthiness, adaptability, innovation, communication, and team capabilities 
as emotional competencies (Goleman, 1998b).  The additions of this model led to the 
characterization of such an approach as “preposterously all-encompassing” (Locke, 2005, p. 
428).   
 Still another research team defined a trait EI as referring to: 
…a constellation of behavioral dispositions and self-perceptions concerning one’s 
ability to recognize, process, and utilize emotion-laden information.  It 
encompasses…empathy, impulsivity, and assertiveness as well as elements of 
social intelligence…and personal intelligence… (Petrides & Furnham, 2003, p. 
278) 
At this point, the pattern is clear: A large number of personality traits are amassed, mixed in with 
a few socio-emotional abilities, and the model is called one of emotional intelligence or trait 
emotional intelligence.  (The “trait” designation is particularly confusing, as trait is typically 
defined as a distinguishing quality, or an inherited characteristic, and could apply to any EI 
model).  Generally speaking, these models include little or no discussion of why certain traits are 
included and others are not, or why, for that matter, certain emotional abilities are included and 
others are not, except for an occasional mention that the attributes are chosen because they are 
most likely to predict success (e.g., Bar-On, 1997).   
 Such approaches are disappointing from a theoretical and construct validity standpoint, 
and they are scientifically challenging in that, with so many independent qualities, it is hard to 
identify a global theme to these lists of attributes.  There is, however, an alternative to such a 
state of (what we see as) disorganization.  We believe that our four-branch model of emotional 
intelligence, for example, provides one conceptually coherent approach (Mayer & Salovey, 
1997).  It is to this model that we turn next. 
 
 THE FOUR-BRANCH MODEL OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
General Introduction to Emotional Intelligence  
Intelligence Considered 
It is possible to develop a coherent approach to the concept of emotional intelligence.  In 
order to describe an emotional intelligence, we need first to define intelligence.  Debates have 
raged from the beginning of intelligence theorizing and testing regarding the nature of 
intelligence, and also, how many intelligences exist (Neisser et al., 1996). However, even the 
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fiercest of ‘g’ theorists, those proposing that intelligence is best described as consisting of a 
single, general mental ability factor, allow for the existence of more specific ability factors (e.g., 
Carroll, 1993).  
Intelligences can be divided up in different ways, for example, according to whether they 
address crystallized (memory-dependent) or fluid (process-dependent) abilities, or, alternatively, 
according to the type of information that is their focus.  The approach that divides intelligences 
into information areas, for example, yields a verbal-propositional intelligence that deals with 
words and logic, and a spatial intelligence that deals with arranging and rotating objects in space, 
among others.   Analogously, an emotional intelligence would address (a) the capacity to reason 
with and about emotions, and/or (b) the contribution of the emotions system to enhance 
intelligence.   
One longstanding grouping of intelligences divides them into verbal/propositional and 
perceptual organizational areas (e.g., Kaufman, 2000).  For decades, researchers have searched 
for an elusive third intelligence, believing that these two core intelligences were insufficient to 
describe individual differences in mental abilities by themselves (Walker & Foley, 1973; 
Wechsler, 1943).  In 1920, Thorndike (1920, p. 228) suggested the existence of a social 
intelligence, which involved “the ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and 
girls – to act wisely in human relations” (see also, Bureau of Personnel Administration, 1930; 
Thorndike & Stein, 1937).  Social intelligence began to be investigated, although it had vocal 
critics – whose criticisms may have impeded the field’s growth (Cronbach, 1960). 
None of the proposed earlier intelligences, however, explicitly concerned an emotional 
intelligence – reasoning validly about emotions and then using emotions in the reasoning 
process.  By the early 1980’s, there was a greater openness to the idea of specific (or multiple) 
intelligences (Gardner, 1983; Guilford, 1959; Sternberg, 1985), and at the same time, research in 
emotions was blossoming.  Ekman (1973) and others had resurrected Darwin’s ideas that some 
emotional information – for example, human facial expressions of certain emotions – are 
universal; others examined how events lead to cognitive appraisals that in turn generate emotions 
(Dyer, 1983; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1993; Sloman & Croucher, 1981; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985).  
Perhaps the elusive intelligence that could complement the traditional dichotomy of 
verbal/propositional and perceptual/organizational might be one of emotional intelligence.  An 
emotional intelligence, after all, when compared to social intelligence, arguably could have a 
more distinct brain locus in the limbic system and its cortical projections (Damasio, 1994; 
LeDoux, 2000; MacLean, 1973; TenHouten, Hoppe, Bogen, & Walter, 1985). An initial theory 
of emotional intelligence developed these ideas, along with a first demonstration study to 
indicate how aspects of it might be measured  (Mayer et al., 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990).    
 Emotions as Signals 
 To describe convincingly what it means to reason with emotions, however, one must 
understand their informational content.  Initially, some people express surprise that emotions 
convey information at all.  Emotions often are viewed as irrational, will o’ the wisp states – even 
pathological in their arbitrariness (Young, 1943).  Although this does describe the operation of 
emotion at times, it is far from a complete picture of a normal, functioning emotion system. 
 The meanings of specific emotion terms have been understood by philosophers for 
hundreds of years (Solomon, 2000) and have been refined by psychologists (Clore, Ortony, & 
Foss, 1987; Frijda, 1988; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985).  For example, happiness includes a signal of wanting to join with others; sadness is a 
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signal of loss, and of wanting comfort (or to be alone).  Until recently, however, the significance 
of these terms was not always recognized.  William James, for example, wrote that he would 
rather “…read verbal descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on my New Hampshire farm…” 
than a catalogue of emotional meanings (James, 1892/1920, p. 375).  
 Such viewpoints began to change as the emotion system became viewed increasingly as 
an evolved signaling system (Darwin, 1872/1998; Ekman, 1973).  To be sure, some differences 
exist in expressing and reading emotions across cultures (Ekman, 1973; Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002a; Mesquita, 2001).  At the same time, there is compelling evidence that many emotion 
meanings are in large part universal – and play a key role in helping people to understand their 
own and others’ actions (e.g., Dyer, 1983; Ekman, 1973).   
 By the 1990’s, the significance of emotions and their meanings were better appreciated 
and were increasingly studied empirically.  The functional role of emotions as communication 
signals became widely accepted, although further issues remain to be explored such as the 
meanings of affective dimensions and how social influences may modify emotional expression 
(Averill, 1992; Barrett & Russell, 1999).  Prominent undergraduate textbooks on emotion and 
research handbooks appeared (e.g., Carlson & Hatfield, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Lewis & Haviland-
Jones, 2000; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996; Strongman, 1996).  Curricula designed expressly to teach 
emotional knowledge and literacy in the schools also have been developed (Brackett et al., 2007; 
Maurer & Brackett, 2004; Wilson, 2007).  
Emotional Intelligence and the  
Four-Branch Model 
 Emotional abilities can be thought of as falling along a continuum from those that are 
relatively lower-level, in the sense of carrying out fundamental, discrete psychological functions, 
to those that are more developmentally complex and operate in the service of personal self-
management and goals.  Crucial among lower-level, fundamental skills is the capacity to 
perceive emotions accurately.  Higher-level skills include, for example, the capacity to manage 
emotions properly.  These skills can be arranged in a rough hierarchy of four branches (these 
branches refer to a tree-like diagram; Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  These include the abilities to (a) 
perceive emotions in oneself and others accurately, (b) use emotions to facilitate thinking, (c) 
understand emotions, emotional language, and the signals conveyed by emotions, and (d) 
manage emotions so as to attain specific goals (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  These four branches 
are illustrated in Figure 1.   
As an example, imagine a situation in which a young man visits a friend in the hospital 
who has been in a car accident.  The first area of emotional intelligence involves perceiving 
emotions.  As the young man surveys the hospital room, the visiting relatives, and his 
unconscious friend, he may wonder, “What is each family member feeling?”  Perhaps he 
perceives the worry and anxiety in their faces.  Feelings are complex; also emerging from within 
him may be fear of his own mortality, and a guilty relief – with a surge in energy – in response to 
being spared the accident himself and remaining unharmed.   
  The anxiety experienced by those around the young man redirects his attention from his 
own concerns to a focus on the well-being of his friend.  Using energy from the fear and relief, 
he may feel motivated to talk with family members and find out how they are.  This is an 
example of using emotion to facilitate thought.   
To understand the emotions of the situation involves asking, “What sorts of feelings 
emerge from such a situation?” and “How can these feelings be expected to change over time?”  
The accident is unexpected and severe, so the family’s shock is palpable.  The young man may 
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reason that one feature of such shock is its emergence from a rapid combination of surprise, 
sadness, and other mostly negative emotions (Goodrum, 2005).   
Knowing this, and understanding the feelings, one possible course would be to engage in 
emotion management.  After regulating his own emotions, perhaps by observing them, and 
thereby psychologically distancing himself from them, the young person may inquire of the 
parents how they came to learn of the accident and how they are holding up, what their days are 
like, and how he can be of assistance.  Listening creates a caring environment while helping to 
clarify the disturbing, ongoing events.  
 
Figure 1.  The Four-Branch Model of emotional intelligence (after Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  Each branch describes 
a set of skills that make up overall emotional intelligence.  Each branch has its own developmental trajectory, 
proceeding from relatively easy skills to more sophisticated ones.  For example, Perceiving Emotions typically 
begins with the ability to perceive basic emotions in faces and voice tones, and may progress to the accurate 
perception of emotional blends, and the detection of emotional micro-expressions in the face. 
 
  
Measuring Emotional Intelligence 
Ability Measures of Emotional Intelligence 
Individual differences exist in each of these four processes. For example, some people are 
more accurate in initially perceiving how each individual in this story might be feeling, 
recognizing their feelings from faces and postures.  Such individual differences can be measured. 
Each ability area of our four-branch model of EI can be operationalized formally as a set of to-
be-solved problems, and test-taker’s responses can be checked against a criterion of correctness.  
There are a number of ability-based scales of emotional perception  (Archer, Costanzo, & Akert, 
2001; Matsumoto, LeRoux, & Wilson-Cohn, 2000), emotional identification and understanding 
(Geher, Warner, & Brown, 2001), and of emotional integrative complexity (Lane, Quinlan, 
Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990).  
Emotional Intelligence 
Managing emotions so as to attain specific goals 
Understanding emotions, emotional language, and the signals  
conveyed by emotions 
 
 
 Using emotions to facilitate thinking 
Perceiving emotions in oneself and others  
accurately 
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One measure that spans these areas is the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence 
Test (MSCEIT).  It consists of eight tasks, two for each of the four branches of our EI model 
(Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2003).  For example, “Perceiving Emotions” is assessed by asking participants to 
identify emotions in pictures of faces, in one task, and in photographs and artwork, in another.   
As another example, one of the “Understanding Emotions” tasks employs items such as the 
following to gauge the capacity to reason with emotions: 
What feeling, when intensified and coupled with a sense of injustice, is most likely to 
lead a person to experience anger?   
 a.  frustration 
 b.  guilt 
 c.  melancholy 
 d.  fatigue 
 
 Responses on the MSCEIT are scored with respect to their degree of correctness, as 
determined by their correspondence with the answers provided by a group of emotions experts 
(i.e., emotion researchers) or a normative sample of the general population. The best answer to 
the sample question above is: “a. frustration,” because, intensified, it leads to anger.  This  
approach to scoring is somewhat similar to that used for certain subtests of classic intelligence 
tests such as Comprehension on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Matarazzo, 1972; 
Wechsler, 1997).  Criticisms of this scoring procedure also have been raised and explored, and 
will be discussed in the next section.  
Theory of the Measurement of Emotional Intelligence 
There are two powerful theoretical reasons why only such a clearly focused, ability-based 
approach can best measure emotional intelligence.  First, intelligences most generally are defined 
as mental abilities, and measuring mental abilities involves asking test-takers relevant questions 
and then evaluating their answers against a criterion of correctness (e.g., Carroll, 1993).  The 
MSCEIT expert scoring system identified correct answers by using the pooled responses of 21 
emotions researchers (Mayer et al., 2003).   
In addition, according to the Standards of Educational and Psychological Testing, 
validity evidence is partly based on response processes.  That is, “Theoretical…analyses of the 
response processes of test takers can provide evidence concerning the fit between the construct 
and the detailed nature of performance or response….” (Joint Committee on Standards, 1999, p. 
12; see also Ployhart, 2006).  Requiring test-takers to meet a criterion of correctness provides an 
excellent fit to the emotional intelligence concept.  Incisive criticism in the area has promoted the 
progression from an early reliance on the consensus of test-takers as a criterion to the use of 
emotions experts (e.g., Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001).  The two approaches to scoring – 
expert and general consensus – correlate highly with each other (Mayer et al., 2003).  However, 
there is further room for refinement of such criteria, including the development of a veridical 
scoring system for many emotional intelligence test items. 
Mixed models of emotional intelligence, recall, are those that mix in many attributes such 
as self-esteem and optimism, into the ability model.  These approaches typically measure EI 
through self-judgments, using items of the form, “I understand my emotions well” (True/False).  
Such items draw information that is filtered through the self-concept of the test-taker.  Test-
takers, however, may or may not be able to understand the question, may or may not have 
received accurate feedback regarding the accuracy of their emotional perceptions before, and 
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may, in their self-evaluations, be influenced by mood and tendencies toward self-
aggrandizement.  In direct tests, self-judgment-based response processes are not highly 
correlated with measured abilities of perceiving, using, understanding, and/or managing 
emotions (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006).  
 In addition, because mixed model tests often include EI-irrelevant variables such as need 
for achievement and self-esteem, they assess the wrong concepts.  Including other variables 
increases the degree of construct-irrelevant variance, which, as it rises, progressively invalidates 
a test (Joint Committee on Standards, 1999).  For example, test makers who add commonly-
studied personality traits (e.g., assertiveness, optimism) to their scales end up measuring 
classically-defined personality traits rather than emotional intelligence.  Naming such a test 
“emotional intelligence” does not clarify this situation.    
 A test that focuses specifically on constructs relevant to EI, and evaluates responses as to 
their correctness possesses good evidence for its validity.  A priori, it stands a much greater 
likelihood to measure the concept successfully.  This is a strictly conceptual issue.  Nonetheless, 
there is substantial empirical evidence, as well, that ability tests such as the MSCEIT measure 
emotional intelligence rather than other constructs, whereas other scales possess considerable 
construct-irrelevant variance – most specifically, an overlap with personality traits such as 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Newsome, Day, & 
Catano, 2000).   
Key Findings Concerning Emotional Intelligence 
and Other Psychological Traits 
 If, as we claim, EI involves a unique source of variation that reflects a new intelligence, 
then it should exhibit some overlap with other intelligence scales.  Studies indicate that EI, 
measured by the MSCEIT and its precursor test the MEIS, correlates about r = .35 or so with 
verbal intelligence, and lower with perceptual-organizational IQ (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 
2000; Mayer et al., 1999).  Most of the overlap with verbal intelligence is accounted for by the 
third branch of the MSCEIT, Understanding Emotions. 
 EI also should be relatively independent of more traditional personality scales.  To test 
this, scales of EI can be correlated with the Big Five personality traits.  The Big Five traits are 
Extraversion-Introversion, Neuroticism-Stability, Openness-Closedness, Agreeableness-
Disagreeableness, and Conscientiousness-Carelessness.  Each of the Big Five traits can be 
divided into more specific traits.  For example, one approach to the Big Five divides 
Extraversion-Introversion into such facets as gregariousness, assertiveness, and warmth (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992).  The Big Five represents a good starting point for frequently studied personality 
dimensions, although some traits arguably are not measured by the Big Five (e.g., educated-
uneducated, diplomatic-humorous, religious-unreligious; Saucier & Goldberg, 1998). 
 EI, defined here as an ability, should have minimal correlations with Big Five traits such 
as Extraversion or Neuroticism: whether people are sociable or emotional, they can be smart 
about emotions.  We did predict that EI would have a modest relation to Openness, as Openness 
often correlates with intelligences (Mayer & Salovey, 1993).  Some representative correlations 
between the MSCEIT and the Big Five are shown in the first row of Table 1;  the scale correlated 
r = .25 with Openness, and r = .28 with Agreeableness, a trait which includes empathic and 
interpersonally sensitive content, and had lower correlations with the rest (Brackett & Mayer, 
2003).   
In contrast, mixed-model self-judgment scales labeled “emotional intelligence” appear to 
measure many variables that are relevant to motivations, social skills, and other areas of 
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personality but not necessarily to an emotional intelligence (Brackett & Mayer, 2003).  Although 
variables such as optimism, self-control, and the like each have specific and uniquely important 
variance, as one measures many such traits together, they begin to reflect broader, more general 
traits of the sort found on the Big Five. 
The relations of several mixed-model scales to the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), a 
measure of the Big Five personality traits, are illustrated in the next rows of Table 1.  Notably, 
mixed model EI scales correlate r = -.57 and -.70 with Neuroticism in two instances, and r = .47 
and .65 with Extraversion in two others; their relations are somewhat lower to Openness or even 
Agreeableness. The overlap between mixed-model measures of EI and the NEO-PI-R becomes 
more striking when it is put into context.  Consider a test explicitly designed to be parallel to the 
NEO-PI-R – the Big Five Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).  The Big Five 
Inventory’s correlations with the NEO-PI-R (Table 1, bottom row) are no higher than many of 
the correlations exhibited by the mixed model EI scales.  That is, the mixed model EI scales 
overlap with the Big Five, sometimes as much as scales explicitly designed to measure the Big 
Five overlap with each other.  The mixed-model scales drop off in prediction for traits such as 
Openness and Agreeableness, which arguably are most likely to be related to EI.  Overall, the 
MSCEIT shows the greatest independence from the Big Five.  The mixed-model scales’ high 
overlap, and their pattern of overlap, with the Big Five indicates that for such mixed-model 
measures, construct-irrelevant variance predominates.    
 
Table 1: Several Relevant Tests Ordered According to their Correlation with the NEO-PI-R measure of the 
Big Five  
 The Big Five 






Emotional Intelligence (as Ability) 
 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test: Total EI a 
-.08** .11* .25*** .28*** .03 
Mixed Model, Self-Judgment Scales 
Self-Report Emotional Intelligence 
Test: Overall EIa 
-.19** .32*** .43*** .09 .25*** 
Emotional Competence Inventory: 
Self-Awareness Clusterb 
-.07 .47** .28** .00 .30** 
Bar-On Emotional Quotient 
Inventory: Overall EQa 
-.57*** .37*** .16* .27*** .48*** 
Trait Emotional Intelligence 
Questionnaire (TEIQue): Overall 
EIc 
-.70*** .65** .44** -.04 .34** 
Big Five Subscales With Each Other (as a Comparison) 
Big Five Inventoryd Extraversion 
with extraversion; neuroticism 
with neuroticism, etc. 
.66*** .76*** .68*** .66*** .70*** 
 
a.  Results from (Brackett & Mayer, 2003); higher correlations between the Bar-On EQ-i and the NEO-FFI have been reported 
(Dawda & Hart, 2000, p. 807);  
b. Correlations from (Boyatzis & Sala, 2004; Murensky, 2000); only cluster-level results are reported.   
c.  Correlations from Petrides & Furnham (2003). 
d. An alternative measure of the Big Five traits correlated with the NEO-PI; results from (Gosling et al., 2003). 
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A final issue concerning the mixed-model scales labeled emotional intelligence is that 
unmoored from any constraints of the EI terminology, they sample across the domain of 
psychological traits in a haphazard fashion.  As a consequence, at least some among the different 
self-judgment mixed-model EI scales in the area correlate at lower levels with one another than 
they do with the Big Five (Brackett & Mayer, 2003). 
Of course, tests such as the MSCEIT must meet additional psychometric standards as 
well: reliability, structural, convergent, and discriminant validity, among them.  The split-half 
reliability of the overall EI score on the MSCEIT is r = .91, with reliabilities for the four 
branches between the high .70s to low .90s, and test-retest reliability in the high .80’s (Mayer et 
al., 2003).  Confirmatory factor analyses indicate that both a 1-factor model, indicating the 
presence of an overall EI, and four-factor models fit the data adequately, with other models 
possible (notably, a three factor model that combines Branches 1 and 2 is also plausible; Gignac, 
2005; Mayer, Panter, Salovey, & Sitaraneos, 2005; Mayer et al., 2003; Palmer, Gignac, 
Manocha, & Stough, 2005). 
One fly in the MSCEIT ointment concerns its convergent validity with other ability 
measures of specific EI skills.  The convergence among ability measures of  
emotional perception such as the JACBART (Matsumoto et al., 2000), the DANVA (Nowicki & 
Duke, 1994) and the MSCEIT is low, with most published values falling between r = .00 to .30 
(Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008).  On the plus side, the subscales of the MSCEIT converge 
with one another (with r’s = .16 to .58), despite using different response formats across branches 
(Mayer et al., 2003).  MSCEIT scores also correlate with the ability to forecast one’s future 
emotions (Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-James, Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007) and with the 
accurate perception of emotion in music (Resnicow, Salovey, & Repp, 2004).  Nonetheless, this 
issue is unsettling and requires further understanding (Mayer et al., 2008).   
 Compared to convergent validity evidence, discriminant validity evidence is promising.  
The very modest correlations between MSCEIT scores and traits of the Big Five (and other 
personality measures), as well as traditional intelligences, strongly indicate that the ability to 
reason about emotions (i.e., emotional intelligence) is a new construct.  We earlier reported some 
MSCEIT-Big Five correlations; the MSCEIT total score correlates at similarly low levels, in the 
r = .20 to .35 range, with verbal intelligence and empathy (Mayer et al., 2004).   
A number of observers and commentators on the field have expressed reservations about 
whether such tests are adequate measures of emotional intelligence, and whether they predict 
important outcomes (e.g., Brody, 2004; Oatley, 2004; Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001).  
The recent Annual Review of Psychology examination of EI and its measurement covers such 
concerns in greater detail, and summarizes many of the central, continuing issues (Mayer et al., 
2008).  To date, however, we believe that ability scales provide the best benchmark for this new 
construct.   
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
General Considerations of the Validity of an EI Measure 
We recognize that the MSCEIT has important limitations, and yet we consider it among 
the better and most widely used of the valid measures available.  As such, we will focus on it in 
this section.  The measurement issues surrounding EI are elements of broader questions:  Is a 
measure such as the MSCEIT a valid assessment of emotional intelligence?   And, can a test such 
as the MSCEIT account for new variance in important outcomes?  In the mid-20th century, 
Emotional Intelligence   13 
psychologists believed that such questions about validity could be answered based on findings 
from key correlational and experimental studies of the test itself (e.g., Barley, 1962).   
A more contemporary view, by contrast, considers the validity of a test a consequence of 
ongoing critical evaluation not only of the test itself, but also of the theoretical framework 
supporting it, and its embeddedness in broader conceptualizations.  For example, a test’s measure 
of a concept depends on how the test author(s) define the concept, and that definition will be 
reliant, in turn, on other hypotheses and definitions, sometimes referred to as auxiliary theories.  
As summarized by Smith: 
…In part for this reason, no theory is ever fully proved or disproved.  At any 
given time, evidence tends to favor some theories or research programs, over 
others (Smith, 2005, pp. 397-398). 
 Thus far, the measurement evidence tends to favor the ability-based EI approach 
described here when compared to other research alternatives (such as dismissing EI or using 
mixed models).  Valid approaches to EI can be divided into two central areas: specific-ability 
approaches, such as the study of accurate emotional perception, and integrative models of EI, 
one example of which is the four-branch model and the MSCEIT (see Mayer et al., 2008, for 
other measures).  Drawing on revised criteria for test validity (Joint Committee on Standards, 
1999), and surveying a diverse group of measures, a recent review of EI research concluded that 
generally, specific and integrative models, and the tests stemming from them, exhibited good 
evidence for the valid measure of EI (Mayer et al., 2008).  Mixed models also were reviewed but 
were not considered to yield adequate measures of EI.   
 Here, we elaborate more specifically on the validity – both general and incremental – of 
the MSCEIT measure and the four-branch approach, particularly as it relates to clinical and 
applied phenomena. Hunsley and Meyer (2003; cf. McFall, 2005) note that “The concept of 
incremental validity is essentially a simple and straightforward one: does a measure add to the 
prediction of a criterion above what can be predicted by other sources of data?” (p. 446).  
Secondarily, new measures can increment conceptual clarity and understanding within a field. 
 Journalistic accounts of EI raised such unrealistic ideas as that “90% of the difference” 
between star performers and other workers is attributable to “emotional intelligence factors,” and 
that 85% of success could be attributed to EI (Goleman, 1998a, p. 94; Watkin, 2000, p. 89) – 
claims we have repeatedly pointed out are misleading and unsupported by research (e.g., Mayer, 
1999; Mayer & Cobb, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer et al., 2000).  Emotional 
intelligence is just one variable among many other mental abilities, cognitive styles, and socio-
emotional traits, and EI should predict important outcomes at levels usually found for other such 
psychological variables. Predictions from psychological measures to outcome variables are 
considered satisfactory for complex behavior in the r =  .10 to .20 range, good in the r  = .20 to 
.30 range, and still better when higher than r  = .30 (Meyer et al., 2001, p. 134).  With this in 
mind, some of the key findings regarding EI and social relationships are shown in Table 2.  We 
selected a small number of results we consider representative of positive findings in this area.    
EI and Understanding Feelings 
 Higher EI does appear to promote better attention to physical and mental processes relevant 
to clinical outcomes.  For example, people higher in some emotional intelligence skills are more 
accurate in detecting variations in their own heartbeat – an emotion-related physiological response 
(Schneider, Lyons, & Williams, 2005).  Higher EI individuals also are better able to recognize and 
reason about the emotional consequences of events.  For example, higher EI individuals are more 
accurate in affective forecasting – that is, in predicting how they will feel at some point in the 
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future in response to an event, such as the outcome of a U.S. presidential election (Dunn et al., 
2007).   
 
Table 2: Selected Correlations From Several Studies Indicating that High EI is Associated with 
Better Social Relations; Low EI with Deviant Behaviora,b 
 







David (2005)   
    SCL-90-R Global Severity Index -31** ∆ R2 = 3% 
    SCL-90-R Positive Symptom Total -38** ∆ R2 = 6% 
    SCL-90-R Positive Symptom Distress -22** ∆ R2 = 1% 
Lopes et al. (2005)   
Peer nominations of interpersonal sensitivity .29* -- 
Peer nominations of interpersonal competence, dominance, 
and assertiveness 
.05 -- 
Reciprocal friendship nominations .23* -- 
Rosete (2007)   
Manager’s rating of achieving business outcomes  .26 ß = .24, p < .01 
Manager’s effective interpersonal behaviors  .52 ß = .49, p < .01 
Brackett & Mayer ( 2003)   
Illegal Drug Use (Amount of marijuana owned?  Times 
used illegal drugs in last month?) 
-.05 -.07 
Social Deviance (Number of physical fights in the last 
year? Number of times vandalized something?) 
-.27** -.20** 
Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, (2004)   
Illegal Drug Use (Times smoked marijuana in the last 
month?  Money spent on drugs in last month?) 
-.32 -- 
Deviant Behavior (Men only) (Number of physical fights 
in last year?  Times vandalized something last year?) 
-.45 --  
Trinidad & Johnson (2002)   
Overall Tobacco and Alcohol Use -.19* -.20* 
a. The criterion scale is the MSCEIT for most studies.  Trinidad & Johnson employed the MEIS, which was a 
precursor ability scale to the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 1999)   
b. For more complete reporting, see (Mayer et al., 2004) 
  
EI and Subjective Symptoms 
Abilities such as affective forecasting are important, for example, because psychotherapy 
patients from a wide diversity of backgrounds seek help with the hopes of gaining insight into 
their feelings and motives (Evans, Acosta, & Yamamoto, 1986; Noble, Douglas, & Newman, 
1999).  If EI increases the attention to and accuracy of knowing one’s feelings under various 
conditions, this could, in turn, minimize one’s psychiatric symptoms.  David (2005) examined EI 
and psychiatric distress on the Symptom Checklist (SCL-90-R).  The higher a person’s EI, the 
lower their reports of symptoms on the Positive Symptom Total, r = -.38, including, for example, 
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fewer headaches and less trouble concentrating.  The Symptom Distress Index, which measures 
symptom intensity, also declined as EI rose, r = -.22.  After controlling for the Big Five 
personality dimensions, EI still accounted for between 1 to 6% of the variance in SCL scales – 
supporting the incremental validity of EI (see Table 2).  Other reports have indicated that, for 
example, those diagnosed with dysthymia have lower EI scores when compared to other 
psychiatric groups (Lizeretti, Oberst, Chamarro, & Farriols, 2006).  
EI and Understanding Social Relationships 
Many psychotherapy clients hope to improve what have become problematic social 
behaviors and relationships (Evans et al., 1986; Noble et al., 1999).  Research on EI indicates 
that people with high emotional intelligence tend to be more socially competent, have better-
quality friendships, and are viewed as more interpersonally sensitive than those lower in EI 
(Brackett et al., 2006; Brackett, Warner, & Bosco, 2005; Lopes et al., 2004; Lopes, Salovey, 
Côté, & Beers, 2005; Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003).  Many associations between EI and these 
kinds of variables remain significant even after controlling for the influence of traditional 
personality variables and general intelligence on the measured outcome.  
 In one study of friendships, the relationship between EI and a person’s engagement in 
destructive responses to life events experienced by one’s friends often were significant, even 
after controlling for the Big Five, psychological well-being, empathy, life satisfaction and Verbal 
SAT scores, but for men only (Brackett et al., 2006), with MSCEIT correlations ranging from r = 
-.02 to -.33.   
 Although the findings described above were based on self-evaluated outcome criteria, 
similar findings come from observer-reports of the same individuals.  For example, judges’ 
positive ratings of a videotaped “getting acquainted” social interaction were predicted by the 
MSCEIT, although again, only for men and not for women.  Ratings of the ability to work well 
with others as well as overall judged social competence correlated r  = .53 and .51, respectively, 
with EI.  The authors noted that significant correlations remained after partialing out the Big Five 
(Brackett et al., 2006). 
Just as higher EI predicts better social outcomes, lower EI predicts interpersonal conflict 
and maladjustment.  Teenagers lower in EI were rated as more aggressive than others and tended 
to engage in more conflictual behavior than their higher-EI peers (Mayer, Perkins, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 2001; Rubin, 1999).  Lower EI also predicted greater drug and alcohol abuse.  For 
example, levels of drug and alcohol use are related to lower EI among males (Brackett, Mayer, & 
Warner, 2004).  Inner-city adolescents’ smoking is also related to their EI (Trinidad & Johnson, 
2002).   
Understanding Work Relationships 
 High EI correlates with better relationships in business settings as well.  Managers higher 
in EI are better able to cultivate productive working relationships with others and to demonstrate 
greater personal integrity according to multi-rater feedback (Rosete & Ciarrochi, 2005).  EI also 
predicts the extent to which managers engage in behaviors that are supportive of the goals of the 
organization according to the ratings of their supervisors  (Côté & Miners, 2006).  In one study, 
38 manufacturing supervisors’ managerial performance were evaluated by their 1258 employees.  
Total EI correlated r  = .39 with these managerial performance ratings, with the strongest 
relations for the ability to perceive emotions and to use emotions (Kerr, Garvin, & Heaton, 
2006). 
 Rosete (2007) studied 122 public service managers’ business and leadership performance 
and found that the MSCEIT related r = .26 to a supervisor’s appraisal of a manager’s effective 
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business performance (“focuses strategically,” “ensures closure and delivers on intended 
results”) and  r = .52 with an appraisal of a manager’s effective interpersonal behaviors (“guides, 
mentors and develops people,” “someone who communicates clearly”).  A hierarchical 
regression analysis predicting effective business performance indicated that EI was a significant 
predictor, even after entering both an estimate of cognitive ability (16 PF scale B) and the Big 
Five.  A similar analysis for the interpersonal behavior rating found that ability EI was also a 
significant predictor after controlling for cognitive ability and personality (see Table 2).   
 A somewhat more complex relationship between EI and other variables was found by 
Coté and Miners (2006).  In their study, employees with low cognitive intelligence (scoring one 
standard deviation or more below the sample mean on the Culture Fair Intelligence Test) 
exhibited better performance and citizenship behavior if they scored higher on the MSCEIT but 
not otherwise, whereas those with high cognitive intelligence (one SD or more above the mean) 
showed no advantage of EI.  In a small-sample study of employees in the finance division of an 
insurance company, higher MSCEIT scores were associated with positive ratings of work 
behavior by peers and supervisors as well as with recommendations for greater year-end salary 
increases (Lopes et al., 2006). 
Considerations of Incremental Validity 
 Empirical evidence suggests that EI often contributes to incremental predictions of social 
effectiveness, over-and-above frequently employed measures of personality and intelligence, as 
exhibited in Table 2. The EI concept further increments our clarity in understanding why certain 
people – those who score higher on EI scales – are more successful in their relationships at home 
and at work.  These higher EI individuals are better able to recognize and reason about their 
emotions, as well as about the emotional consequences of their decisions, and the emotions of 
others.  Together, the empirical and conceptual increments indicate that EI is a useful variable 
for study.    
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Emotional Intelligence as a  
Valid and Significant New Concept 
 In this article, we have argued that there exists a valid and conceptually important new 
variable for investigators and practitioners.  Emotional intelligence can be defined as an 
intelligence that explains important variance in an individual’s problem solving and social 
relationships.  Yet, the acceptance of the construct is threatened, perhaps, less by its critics than 
by those who are so enthusiastic about it as to apply the term indiscriminately to a variety of 
traditional personality variables (as pointed out by Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003; Murphy & 
Sideman, 2006). 
Why Do Some Investigators and Practitioners Use the Term  
Emotional Intelligence Overly Broadly? 
Expansion of the Emotional and Cognitive Areas of Thinking 
 Why are traits such as the need for achievement, self-control, and social effectiveness (let 
alone character and leveraging diversity) sometimes referred to as emotional intelligence?  
Perhaps one contributing cause is a lack of perspective on personality as a whole.  Psychology 
needs good overviews of the central areas of mental function – models that define personality’s 
major areas.  Yet few such overviews reached any level of currency or consensus in the 
psychology of the 1980s and 1990s. Hilgard (1980) indicated that psychology is thrown out-of-
balance by the absence of such models.  Indeed, the cognitive revolution of the 1970s and 1980s 
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(Miller, 2003), followed by the intense interest in affective (emotional) sciences in the 1980s and 
1990s (e.g., Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003), contributed to a sense that cognitive and emotional 
systems were dominant aspects of the whole of personality.  Many psychologists and other 
investigators began to refer to cognition, affect, and behavior, as though it provided complete 
coverage of the study of mental life (e.g., Thompson & Fine, 1999).  In that impoverished 
context, the term emotional intelligence could be mistaken as a label for much of mental 
processing.  In fact, however, the three-legged stool of cognition, affect, and behavior under-
emphasizes such areas of personality as representations of the self, motivation, and self-control 
processes; more comprehensive models have since been proposed (Mayer, 2003, 2005; 
McAdams & Pals, 2006). 
Reaction to the Big Five 
Also during the 1980s and 1990s, the most pervasive empirical work in personality 
psychology involved the study of the Big Five traits (Goldberg, 1993; Goldberg & Rosolack, 
1994; John & Srivastava, 1999) – so much so, that many people identified personality as merely, 
or essentially, the Big Five (Block, 1995).  Yet that Big Five model dispossessed many 
traditionally important personality variables (Block, 1995; Mayer, 2005).  There was a reaction 
against the Big Five model which had, during those years, so represented the field.   
The advent of emotional intelligence encouraged some to revisit a number of social and 
emotional traits and conceive of them as forming new models of social effectiveness and well 
being.  Furnham and Petrides included self-judged adaptability, assertiveness, social 
competence, and stress management, among others, in their model, which were included under 
those authors’ label trait emotional intelligence (Petrides & Furnham, 2001, pp. 40, 47).  
Acknowledging the considerable overlap between their dimensions and those of the Big Five 
traits, they stated: 
…even if there were complete overlap between trait EI and the main personality 
dimensions…We believe that the theoretical and explanatory power of any 
psychological construct, including trait EI, is much more important than its 
incremental validity… (Petrides & Furnham, 2001, p. 54). 
Their research was recently used as part of the basis for the launch of yet another self-judgment 
scale under the name EI (Tett et al., 2005).  
 Although we agree that theoretical clarity is, at times, more important than incremental 
validity, we also believe in staying within scientific bounds in the use of such terms as emotion 
and intelligence – unless, of course, such terms require revision.  Those investigators who 
wander outside the conceptual network, however, offer no rationale for revising such terms.    
The Seduction of the Emotional 
 There is a broader cultural perspective, as well, that may promote such yearnings for a 
broader emotional intelligence.  Throughout history, philosophers and pundits alike have argued 
about whether to follow one’s “head” or “heart.”  Through much of this time, the “heads” have 
had the upper hand, so to speak.  The Stoic tradition that thought trumps emotions is well-
embedded in Western philosophy.  Still, at times, those with emotional urges have leapt forward 
to argue that the heart should be all-important.  It appears that some of our writings have inspired 
a bit of an outbreak of that type. 
 And yet, this would be a mistake as it represents a false dichotomy (cf. Damasio, 1994).  
Relying on emotional characteristics, or on motives, or on any single part of personality would 
leave the individual unbalanced, from our perspective.  A truly healthy individual has neither 
thought alone, nor emotion alone, but a functional integration among their major psychological 
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processes.  In this view, mental energy – a combination of motives and emotions – works with 
adaptive thinking, and leads to effective behaviors, all the while being monitored, guided, and 
controlled, where necessary by self-consciousness (Mayer, 2007).  Being warm is not enough 
(although it may be pleasant), ditto exhibiting assertiveness.  Rather, it all must come together 
for personality to work.   
Our Viewpoint 
We agree with a number of observers of the area that emotional  intelligence is used in 
too all-inclusive a fashion and in too many different ways (Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005; Matthews 
et al., 2004; Murphy, 2006).  Referring to the broadened definitions in particular, Locke 
remarked, “What does EI…not include?” (Locke, 2005, p. 428)  We believe that there is a valid 
EI concept.  However, we certainly agree that there is widespread misuse of the term to apply to 
concepts that simply are not concerned with emotion or intelligence or their intersection.  The 
misuses of the term are, to us, invalid in that they attempt to overthrow or subvert the standard 
scientific language in psychology, with no apparent rationale for so doing.  Other investigators 
similarly have pointed out that it is important to distinguish between valid and invalid uses of the 
concept (Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005; Gohm, 2004); to date, however, this message has not been 
heeded as we believe it should be.      
Recommendations 
…The tradition of exaggerated tenderness in psychiatry and psychology reflects 
our “therapeutic attitude” and contrasts with that of scholars in fields like 
philosophy or law, where a dumb argument is called a dumb argument, and he 
who makes a dumb argument can expect to be slapped down by his 
peers…(Meehl, 1973, p. 228). 
Those investigators interested in EI increasingly are asking to clarify what is and is not 
legitimate work in the field.  Murphy and Sideman (2006, p. 296) put it as to “succeed in 
separating the valid work from the hype.”  One central concern of our own (and of others), here 
and elsewhere, has been to distinguish better from poorer approaches to EI.    
 From our perspective, renaming the Big Five and other classic personality traits as 
“emotional intelligence” reflects a lack of understanding of personality theory and undermines 
good scientific practice.  It obscures the meaning of emotional intelligence, and emotional 
intelligence is an important enough new construct as to make that unfortunate and problematic.  
It is only when the term is reverted to its legitimate meaning within the conceptual, scientific 
network, that it can be taken seriously (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Joint Committee on Standards, 
1999).  There are a good number of researchers who understand this, and who have used the term 
consistently in a meaningful fashion.  As for the others, one of the reasons for writing this article 
is to convince them of the common sense of using the current personality terminology.  On a 
very practical level, it is often impossible to evaluate a journal article purporting to study 
emotional intelligence based upon keywords or the abstract: The study may examine well-being, 
assertiveness, self-perceptions of emotional abilities, or actual abilities.   
We have provided an overview of emotional intelligence in particular with an eye to help 
distinguish emotional intelligence from other more traditional personality variables.  We have 
attempted to make it clearer than before where emotional intelligence begins and ends, and 
where other personality approaches pick up.  Much of the mixed-model research on EI 
(sometimes called EQ), can be described by Lakatos (1968, as cited by Smith, 2005) as a 
“degenerating research program” which consists of a series of defensive shifts in terminology 
and hypotheses “unlikely to yield new knowledge or understanding” (Smith, 2005, p. 401).  
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 We realize that the recommendations below may be obvious to many, even to those who 
have not read our article. To be as clear as we can be, however, we propose a set of simple 
recommendations that we believe will help to safeguard the field and foster its progress.  
Recommendation 1: In our opinion, the journalistic popularizations of EI frequently 
employ inadequate and overly broad definitions of EI, implausible claims, and 
misunderstandings of the concepts and research more generally. We urge researchers and 
practitioners alike to refer to the scientific literature on emotions, intelligence, and emotional 
intelligence to guide their thinking.  Simply put, researchers need to cite the research literature 
rather than journalistic renderings of scientific concepts, which serve a different purpose.  
Recommendation 2:  Referring to the diverse approaches to EI, one research group 
observed: “It is precisely because of this heterogeneity that we need clear conceptualization and 
definition” (Zeidner et al., 2004, p. 247).  To restore clarity to the study of EI, we recommend 
that the term emotional intelligence be limited to abilities at the intersection between emotions 
and intelligence – specifically limited to the set of abilities involved in reasoning about emotions, 
and of using emotions to enhance reasoning.   
Recommendation 3:  We recommend that those interested in EI refocus on research 
relevant to the ability conception of emotional intelligence.  This includes studies using 
emotional knowledge measures, emotional facial recognition ability, levels of emotional 
awareness, emerging research on emotional self-regulation, and related areas (e.g., Elfenbein & 
Ambady, 2002b; Izard et al., 2001; Lane et al., 1990; Mayer et al., 2003; Nowicki & Mitchell, 
1998).  
Recommendation 4:  We recommend that groups of widely studied personality 
traits, including motives such as the need for achievement, self-related concepts such as 
self-control, emotional traits such as happiness, and social styles such as assertiveness 
should be called what they are, rather than being mixed together in haphazard-seeming 
assortments and named emotional intelligence.   
Recommendation 5:  Much remains unknown about emotional intelligence (Matthews, 
Zeidner, & Roberts, 2007).  Our final recommendation is that, following the clearer terminology 
and conceptions above, good theorizing and research in emotional intelligence continue until 
more is known about the concept, and human mental abilities more generally.  Enough has been 
learned to indicate that this is a promising area, but also that significant gaps in knowledge 
remain.  For example, there needs to be greater attention to issues of culture and gender and their 
impact on theories of emotional intelligence and the measurement of emotional intelligence.  
Further progress in the measurement of emotional intelligence generally is also required. The 
MSCEIT, we believe, is a useful, integrative approach to measuring emotional intelligence, 
although we acknowledge that the test has its limits, for example, in the assessment of emotional 
perception (e.g., O'Sullivan & Ekman, 2004; Roberts et al., 2006).  Applications of EI must be 
conducted with much greater attention to the research literature, be grounded in good theory, and 
reject outlandish claims.  
We realize that there are many stakeholders in this area, a number of whom would 
naturally hope to continue using the term emotional intelligence as they have been.  We hope 
that highlighting, on the one hand, the valid criticism of the overly-broad uses of the EI term, and 
by recommending alternatives, we can apply some persuasion gradually to discourage such 
usage, and make others aware of its problematic nature. That said, we continue to believe that 
emotional intelligence is an important, newly described construct.  It organizes a number of 
specific mental abilities having to do with identifying, understanding, managing, and using 
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emotions, it is distinct from other constructs, it unifies a set of heretofore diverse set of 
psychological processes for examination, and it makes practical, though modest, predictions 
about key interpersonal behaviors.   
In this article, we hope to have separated this emotional intelligence from other constructs 
that may be important in their own rights but are ill-labeled as emotional intelligence.  By 
clarifying our model and discussing some of the confusion in the area, we hope to encourage 
researchers and practitioners to distinguish emotional intelligence from other domains of study.  
Such distinctions will help pave the way for a healthier, more convincing, and better understood 
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